Privacy Preserving Data Mining (PPDM) aims at performing data mining among multiple parties, and at the meantime, no single party suffers the threat of releasing private data to any others. Nowadays, cloud service becomes more and more popular. However, how to deal with privacy issues of cloud service is still developing. This paper is one of the first researches in cloud server based PPDM. We propose a novel protocol that the cloud server performs data mining in encrypted databases, and our solution can guarantee the privacy of each client. This scheme can protect client from malicious users. With aid of a hardware box, the scheme can also protect clients from untrusted cloud server. Another novel feature of this solution is that it works even when the database from different parties are overlapping.
INTRODUCTION

Motivation
The privacy preserving data mining (PPDM) problem has draw a lot of attentions in recent years (Verykios et al., 2004) . Multiple participants intend to collaboratively mine the data from their combined database. Also, no single participant's private data will be released to any other party. In this paper, we focus on solving one PPDM problem with decision tree technique. Note that although many previous works (Goethals et al., 2004) , (Kantarcioglu and Clifton, 2004) , (Kantarcioglu and Kardes, 2009) , , (Jha et al., 2005) , (Zhan et al., 2005) did the research on PPDM problem through various directions, they did not give a concrete definition of PPDM. Here, we start with defining the PPDM problem with decision tree as follows (for convenience, we call it PPDM DT PC):
Definition 1: PPDM DT PC.
• There are n parties (n ≥ 2). Call them C 1 , . . . ,C n .
• C i has a private two-dimensional database DB i = d i, j,k , where d i, j,k means the cell data at the position of row j, column k in DB i .
• A subset of {C 1 , . . . ,C n }, denoted by C sub , cooperate to construct a decision tree based on their corresponding databases.
• After the decision tree is built up, C i only gets the result (i.e. the decision tree DT ) without knowing any data of DB j for any j = i.
There have been many researches working on PPDM problem with decision tree, and they gave out many feasible solutions to different distributions of databases, such as horizontally distributed database (Lindell and Pinkas, 2000) and vertically (Wang et al., 2004) , (Fung et al., 2005) , (Du and Zhan, 2002) , (Vaidya and Clifton, 2005) , (Fang et al., 2010) distributed database. Since all previous researches proposed solutions based on the private databases stored in participants' personal computers, we collectively call the above definition as PC-based PPDM problem (PPDM DT PC). Up to our best knowledge, all PPDM DT PC solutions suffer the same two shortness: 1) Low efficiency. Most of PPDM DT PC solutions requires a large amount of communication messages, in order to achieve the privacy protection of each participant; 2) Limitation to non-overlapping database. There is no existing PC-based PPDM solution able to deal with overlapping database.
Besides the above problems, all PPDM DT PC solutions cannot be applied to the modern Cloud computing environment. As cloud computing is becoming more and more popular nowadays, therefore, we want to design a system of PPDM utilizing cloud computing (We call it PPDM DT Cloud). There is an additional advantage of using cloud environment to solve PPDM. The cloud service not only can handle overlapping databases from different participants, but also provide an efficient solution due to communication messages among different parties can be reduced.
Planting this problem into cloud platform is not easy. We have to notice another significant aspect of cloud computing -privacy issue. Due to the infrastructure of the cloud service, the privacy of cloud computing has been becoming a hot topic attracting many researchers attention (Pearson, 2009) , (Singh et al., 2010) . Cloud service provides clients a convenient environment to utilize services supplied by cloud server instead of PC. Nowadays, cloud server has been adopted to more and more applications. It is not avoidable that clients will enter personal data when utilizing the service provided by cloud server. Therefore, it is very important to consider the privacy service when design the cloud server.
Here, we would like to give out a version of definition of PPDM on decision tree in cloud environment. We call it PPDM DT Cloud. This definition in cloud scenario involves an extra party: the cloud server -CS. CS is usually a group of machines. Databases are stored in encrypted format in the cloud server to protect the privacy of clients. The definition is as follows:
Definition 2: PPDM DT Cloud
• There is a cloud server -CS and n parties C 1 , . . . ,C n where (n ≥ 2).
• C i has a private two-dimensional database DB i = {d i, j,k }, where d i, j,k means the cell data on the row j and column k in DB i . The database is stored in the cloud service provided by CS in the encrypted format.
• A subset of {C 1 , . . . ,C n }, denoted by C sub , decide to construct a decision tree based on their corresponding databases.
• After the decision tree is built up, CS will inform each party in C sub about the decision tree. Doing so, C i does not know DB j for any j = i.
However, the above solution cannot be achieved directly, because it is not so easy for CS to build up the decision tree when all DB i are in different encrypted formats. More specifically, each DB i is encrypted by the unique key of the owner C i . This paper will propose a novel scheme to solve this problem. Even if the cloud server is untrusted (in cases of using a public cloud), we introduce an easy-to-deploy hardware to protect the system from the untrusted server. If the server is trusted (in cases of using a private cloud), a software implementation is sufficient to achieve the needed security and privacy.
Potential Applications
Cloud computing is a proper platform for multiple users to cooperate on some applications. For example, a bank performs a collaborated data mining using its customer database and the database of another bank, to judge whether it should approve a debt for some bank client according to his personal information and previous credit situation (like Table 1 & 2). In the meantime, the bank cannot see the database details of another bank. Another application is in the area of digital forensics. Law enforcing authorities may need to look into information on many different database to mine criminal behaviours, but at the same time should preserve privacy.
The cloud server platform provides a feasible and efficient way to solve these problems. However, the private information of bank clients and suspected criminals are usually confidential. As a result, we must propose a novel solution for cloud-based privacy preserving data mining, which works on encrypted confidential information. We will elaborate this novel scheme in the following sections.
Our Contributions
1. We propose the first solution for PPDM on decision tree utilizing the cloud server. An additional advantage of planting the PPDM into the cloud server platform is much more efficient than PCbased PPDM.
2. PPDM DT Cloud can also handle the overlapping databases case which has not been resolved before.
3. We modify the traditional ElGamal cryptographic algorithm in our scheme, which can protect par-
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ticipants' privacy from the threat of any malicious parties.
4. Also, we design an easy-to-deploy hardware Black Box which is an auxiliary device to unify the data from various sources, to protect the threat of an untrusted cloud server.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we introduce the related work in the field of privacy preserving data mining. In Section 3, we explain some preliminary knowledge which is required for understanding our scheme. Section 4 analyse the security requirements of PPDM DT Cloud. In Section 5, we depict our novel algorithm to solve the PPDM DT Cloud using Paillier cryptography and ElGamal algorithm. Sections 6 presents a brief security analysis. Section 7 concludes our paper.
RELATED WORK
Privacy preserving data mining (PPDM) can be traced back to Yao's millionaire problem (Yao, 1986) . PPDM helps participators in collaborating their private databases to reach an accountable result without exploring their own secret data. PPDM can be classified by different criteria.
Since our work is about building decision tree, here we focus on previous research works in this topic. (Yang et al., 2005 ) developed a privacy-preserving frequency mining algorithm based on the homomorphic cryptography property, which can be utilized in naive Bayes classifier, ID-3 trees and association rule mining. However, this algorithm was restricted by the efficiency, e.g. it only could deal with a small number of attributes. (Lindell and Pinkas, 2000) discussed the ID-3 decision tree on the horizontally distributed database, while (Wang et al., 2004) ; (Du and Zhan, 2002) ; (Vaidya and Clifton, 2005) and (Fang et al., 2010) discussed algorithms for vertically distributed database. In particular, (Wang et al., 2004) and (Du and Zhan, 2002) only considered the situation that both parties know the class attributes. Jaideep et al. conquered this limitation in (Vaidya and Clifton, 2005) by building an ID-3 decision tree. (Du and Zhan, 2002) could not deal with the situation if one party lies about its input.
Since the rapid development of cloud computing, the privacy issue just begins to draw attentions of cloud service providers and users. It is unavoidable that applications involving the private data must be used in cloud service. As a result, designing a secure cloud environment which protects privacy becomes more significant. Detailed reasons of why privacy is so important for cloud computing can be found in (Pearson, 2009) .
In 2010, Singh et al. gave out a cryptography based PPDM solution for cloud computing (Singh et al., 2010) , which mainly addressed the clustering problem with k-NN classifier. They extended the Jaccard measure to test the equality of two encrypted items. In this protocol, it needed a semi-honest third party who can access the decrypted data and this assumption allowed the threat to the privacy of users. Up to our best knowledge there are no previous work in cloud computing environment that builds decision tree.
PRELIMINARY KNOWLEDGE
ID-3 Algorithm
Decision tree is one important traditional model for data mining. ID-3 (Quinlan, 1986 ) is one data mining algorithm for building the decision tree.
There are two important issues in such algorithms based on possibility statistic: one is the best split point and the other one is stopping criteria (Bhatnagar et al., 2010) .
For the former one, the ID-3 algorithm chooses the attribute with the maximum Gain value to split. To calculate the Gain, firstly the information entropy (E(S)) of the dataset S is calculated as follows:
where n is the number of different values of attributes in S; f S (i) is the frequency of the value i in the dataset S.
After that, the Gain (G(S, A)) is calculated as follows: For the latter one, there are three main criteria for stopping growing the tree: a) The tree has already reached the maximum depth; b) there has already been minimum number of data points for one branch; c) all of the points share the same label.
Homomorphic Encryption and Paillier Cryptography
In short, homomorphic encryption can satisfy the demand that one kind of algebraic calculation on cipher text will be reflected as another kind of algebraic calculation on plain text (Fontaine and Galand, 2007) . This concept was firstly proposed by R.L. Rivest et al. in (Rivest et al., 1978) , and in 2009 Craig Gentry (Gentry, 2009 ) published the first fully homomorphic encryption scheme using lattice-based cryptography. The homomorphic encryption property is usually presented as:
In our paper, we choose Paillier cryptography (Paillier, 1999) which is a probabilistic asymmetric algorithm for public key cryptography.
The biggest advantage of Paillier cryptography is that we can get different cipher text from the same plain text, with different random numbers used in the encryption process. This advantage can help our scheme to protect the client from eavesdropping.
REQUIREMENTS OF PPDM DT Cloud
Before we describe the details of PPDM DT Cloud scheme, we firstly need to investigate requirements for solving this problem.
In PPDM DT Cloud, we concern that only authorized user can have access to the data. Even if unauthorized user access to the data, he will get the wrong one.
Here, we try to design a scheme to protect active attacks from the cloud server, as well as a malicious client. Now we list the structural components in PPDM DT Cloud:
• Central Cloud Server (CCS): There is one CCS which acts as the interface between cloud service users and other cloud services.
• Distributed Storage Server (DSS): There are many DSS which provide the storage space.
• Distributed Computation Server (DCS): There are many DCS which carry out the computing task.
• Cloud Service Users (Client): the users who communicate with CCS to indirectly get services from different DSS and DCS.
Note that CCS, DCS and DSS together is the Cloud Server (CS) in the definition PPDM DT Cloud.
Also, DSS and DCS are conceptual entities. In practice, they can be the same machine.
We have to design a system which can satisfy the following criteria:
1. Client Security: In private cloud, the cloud server can be trusted but the user may suffer the attack from other malicious users.
2. Strong Client Security: In a public cloud environment, there is no guarantee that the cloud server or other users of cloud service are honest. We have to assume the cloud server is untrusted. Therefore, all of data which is stored in the cloud server has to be encrypted, and only the data owner can decrypt them. Note that it is s stronger security requirement than the first criteria (Client Security).
Service Availability:
The system has to make sure that the owner of the data can access / search / proceed any function on his own data at any time.
Correctness:
The system also need to guarantee the correctness of the data which is stored in the cloud server.
PPDM Feasibility:
This requirement involves two mainly aspects: 1) satisfy the general requirement on PPDM, which means that any participant will have no idea about the other parties' private data; 2) the data mining result is correct (i.e. gives out the same output as PPDM DT PC).
It is not easy to design a scheme to satisfy all above five criteria simultaneous. For the first and second requirements, the data is encrypted by its owner and the owner keeps the secret key. No one else can access to this secret key.
As for the fifth requirement, the data mining is implemented on the combined database from multiple clients, which means that databases from different owners are encrypted by separate secret keys. However, the necessary but not sufficient condition for data mining on the encrypted database is that the same message has to share the same transformed format in the database.
For example, in Table 1 , Customer C1's age is 50. This cell is also in Bank-2's database. In the cloud server, these two cells are kept as E Bank−1 (50) and E Bank−2 (50) which are encrypted by Bank-1 and Bank-2's key separately. However, it is impossible for the cloud server to process data mining on encrypted data with two different keys. Therefore, before data mining, the cloud server has to transform databases DATA2012-InternationalConferenceonDataTechnologiesandApplications from different clients, into a unified format. We assume that a transformation function f (·) can achieve this purpose. After going through f key (·) we always get f key (E Bank−1 (50)) = f key (E Bank−2 (50)). Otherwise, the system cannot satisfy the third requirement.
Note that the second requirement is in fact a stronger version of the first requirement. Actually, in our designed scheme, if all steps are implemented in software, requirements 1, 3, 4, 5 are satisfied but requirement 2 is not (i.e. there is an attack involving a malicious untrusted cloud server). In order for our scheme to satisfy requirement 2 as well, we need the help of a Black Box (BB), which is a tamper-resistant hardware token.
In this paper, for convenience, we describe our solution PPDM DT Cloud with the hardware Black Box. In applications (such as in a private cloud) that requirement 1 is needed instead of requirement 2, the solution can be trivially modified by putting all BB implementation in software and some simple key structure modifications. Details will be described in the beginning of Section 5.
Black Box: Here, we need a tamper-resistant hardware Black Box to help the system defending the eavesdropping threat. Inside the BB, there is prestored key pair (a private key and a public key). The private key can only be utilized by functions inside the BB. In other words, the private key will never be leaked out. Note that as all BB contain the same key structure. In our system, we need one BB is a Client (we call it a Client-side BB) and the same kind of BB is also used in a DSS (we call it a DSS-side BB). Therefore only one kind of BB is needed to be manufactured, and this is a significant advantage in production. We will elaborate the detailed usage of this Black Box in Section 5
CLOUD-BASED PPDM WITH UNTRUSTED CLOUD SERVER
We roughly divide the whole process into five phases and the overall system is depicted in Algorithm 1: We consider the public and private cloud environment individually. If cloud server is untrusted (i.e. the public cloud case), there is a threat that the cloud server can get the plain text of data from clients. To protect clients' privacy from the untrusted cloud server, as stated in Section 4, we need help of an external hardware (the BB) to defend this attack.
On the other hand, if the cloud server is trusted (i.e. the private cloud case), as mentioned in Section 4, strong client security is not needed. We can have a simple scheme without using the hardware BB. In this case, BB can be substituted by software. Also as BB is not needed, the private key of BB will be replaced by a private key shared by CCS and all DSS. For the sake of ease discussion, in this paper we only present the solution with BB for PPDM involving an untrusted cloud server. In our scheme, we choose a modified ElGamal cryptography model combining with Paillier cryptography as the encryption cryptography.
In our scheme, we use Black Box (BB) to implement three algorithms, namely Algorithm 2 in Phase 1, Algorithm 3 in Phase 3, and Algorithm 5 in Phase 4. Any outside party can only call BB to execute these CloudbasedPrivacyPreservingDataMiningwithDecisionTree 9 three algorithms.
Phase 1: Initialization
Before the client submits his private database to CCS, he needs to encrypt the data since there is a threat of unauthorized access. For simplicity, we use the notation in Section 1. d i, j,k is the cell data in C i 's database, at the position of row j, column k.
As mentioned in Section 4, the necessary but not sufficient condition for PPDM DT Cloud is that the same message has to be encrypted to the same cipher text. Therefore, we choose the mechanism of Group Key in our scheme. However, not any cryptographic algorithm can be used with Group Key. Here, we choose the modified ElGamal and Paillier cryptography. The encryption and decryption of the modified ElGamal algorithm are denoted by EG key (·) and DG key (·) . While those of the Paillier algorithm are denoted by P key (·) and Q key (c). Besides the pre-stored Paillier key pair, there is also a pre-stored hash function H(·) inside BB.
The core part of Phase 1, Algorithm 2, is shown below. 
There are two significant points needed to be emphasized:
1. The pre-defined function H(·) for generating the pseudo random number, must have the uniqueness property. This means that for any m 1 = m 2 , we must have H(m 1 ) = H(m 2 ). H(·) can be a collision resistant cryptographic hash function. The purpose of requiring the uniqueness of the pseudo random function is to make sure that CCS can successfully process data mining on the combined database from various clients.
2. The Paillier cryptography P(·) implemented by BB, has the property of a non-unique mapping, which means that for any m 1 = m 2 , there can be P key (m 1 ) = P key (m 2 ). This nonunique mapping can protect the private data from unauthorized access. Once the unauthorized party accesses the cipher-text of , j, k) )), he cannot deduce d i, j,k from P BB (r i, j,k ) even if he also has the same cell in his database. The property of nonunique mapping can eliminate this threat.
Phase 2: Distributed Storage Mechanism
One service supplied by the CCS is availability, which means that the client can access to their data even though some DSS are down. In another word, the CCS has to keep the backup of clients' data in different DSS. CCS can save the whole database from one client into n (n 2) separate DSS, or divide the database into several overlapping parts and assign them into various DSS. No matter which approach CCS chooses, any eavesdropper could not recognize the source according to the cipher-text which are sent back by DSS. After CCS gets the encrypted database from client, it will distribute the database to one or more DSS.
Phase 3: Unifying the Database
Phase 3.1: Agreement on PPDM
When a group of clients C sub want to carry out a PPDM DT Cloud action, they will issue a PPDM command. Then each member C i needs to send a command to CCS with PubEG C i . CCS will check the correctness of received commands, then broadcasts the identity of members in C sub to DSS.
Phase 3.2: Unifying Individual Database Components
A DSS who stores some part of encrypted database belong to a member in C sub will pass the database component to a DSS-side BB, and returns the output to CCS. Before carrying out data mining, the preparation work is to unify various formats of encrypted data, with a Group Key negotiated by C sub .
With public ElGamal keys of all M members in C sub , DSS can construct one partial Group Keys for each group member. The partial Group Key for C i is:
In a DSS-side BB, Algorithm 3 is executed. Firstly, BB checks the correctness of cipher text of d i, j,k . Then BB combines the public ElGamal key of C i with partial Group Key GPkey i as the whole Group Key GPkey, to unify the data from different sources.
Algorithm 3: The second function in BB.
INPUT: [P BB (r i, j,k (d i, j,k ) then go to next step. Otherwise, return an error message to DSS. 4: Encrypt the data d i, j,k with GPkey:
Phase 3.3: Combine Different Databases
DSS combines partial uniformed database of different C sub members together. DSS also can deal with the special case of overlapped parts among different members' databases. As a matter of fact, this kind of situation is quite common. For example, one bank custom may choose more than one commercial banks to borrow money. Once one bank wants to decide whether it should continue to lend the money to this custom, the bank prefers to make the decision based on this custom's previous loan history of all other banks rather than this bank only. However, as stated in Section 1, all previous researches did not give out any solution to this special situation, because the PC-based solution cannot securely solve this problem in an efficient way. The cloud computing technology provides a feasible platform to resolve this kind of problem. In our scheme, we utilize the homomorphic property of ElGamal algorithm to make the calculation on cipher text possible. The exact work which CCS needs to do is shown in Algorithm 4:
The rough idea of the combination work is as follows. DSS judges whether there are any records from different sources sharing the same primary key. If yes, DSS checks under the same attribute whether the value from different sources are more than one. Again, if yes, DSS carry out the calculation according to the pre-defined rules. If the rule asks for keeping Let PK be the primary key attribute and the set of value is PK = {PK 1 , PK 2 , PK 3 , . . .} |PK| is the size of PK for i = 1 to |PK| do if there are more than one records whose primary key = PK i then let A be the set of all attributes for j = 1 to |A| do if the rule for A j is keeping the same value of those records then keeping the same value else if the rule for A j is multiplying different values of those records then multiplying those records end if end for end if end for the same value or multiplying different items, DSS can complete the computation on the cipher text directly.
After the combination, DSS only sends EG GPkey (d i, j,k ) to CCS. The reason is to save the communication flow and for the purpose of security,
Phase 4: Cloud Decision Tree Building
In Phase 4.1, CCS will build the decision tree DT using the ID-3 algorithm. Before CCS carries out the decision tree building, it firstly combines the databases from different DSS. As for the overlapped parts, CCS also goes through Algorithm 4. After that, Phase 4.2 is executed. With an encrypted database, CCS can easily follows the standard ID-3 algorithm to construct a decision tree DT from this encrypted database. In our design, CCS will not run the ID-3 algorithm on its own. Instead, CCS takes advantage of the cloud computing environment, to coordinate different DCS to run the ID-3 algorithm in a distributed manner. Doing so, the running time of ID-3 will be reduced.
For a large size database, the workload for statistic computation in ID-3 is heavy for a single CCS and thus is a suitable computational task to be distributed to different DCS. Many DCS can share workload for statistic computation in parallel. Meanwhile, CCS plays the role as a controller, which means that CCS assigns the computational work to DCS.
As mentioned in Section 3, the major computa-tional part of ID-3 is the statistic computation of attribute frequency and calculating the Gain value.
Here we describe how the calculation of the frequency and the Gain value can be distributed to different DCS.
CCS firstly groups the database entries according to the value of classified attribute. After that CCS sends the grouped encrypted data of one column to one DCS. Then each DCS calculates the Gain value corresponding to that column, and sends this value to CCS. After collecting all Gain values corresponding to different columns from different DCS, CCS will select the maximum one as the current node. CCS and DCS repeat the above steps until reaching the stopping point of the ID-3 algorithm.
Let us take the 
column, E(HighSchool(HS)), E(University(U)) in the Yes Group and E(HS), E(U), E(HS) in the
No Group, to other DCS who has the attribute with non-maximum Gain value. Similarly, DCS calculate Gain value and CCS choose the maximum one as the second-level node. CCS and DCS repeat the above steps until reaching the stopping point.
Phase 5: Output
Phase 5.1
After CCS and DCS finish the collaboration work on decision tree building, CCS has a whole encrypted decision tree. The last step is to send back the result to each participant C i . CCS calls Algorithm 5 to get g r i, j,k , and send it back with EG GPkey (d i, j,k ) to each C i . CCS uses Algorithm 5, the third function in BB, to decrypt r i, j,k . Then each C i gets the whole decision tree which is built from the combined database.
Phase 5.2
C sub also need to check the correctness of DT and we use the method stated in (Du and Zhan, 2002) for this checking process. For simplicity, here we give a simple walk-through of the checking as follows:
C sub chooses one entry with the same primary key value in each C i 's database, d i, j = {d i, j,k |k = 1, 2, . . .}. d i, j is one single row in C i 's database. Each C i traverses through the DT based on the value of this entry to create a vector V i = v 1 , . . . , v p where p is the number of leaf nodes in DT . If a node is split using C i s attribute, C i traverses to all children of the node. If C i reaches a leaf node q, he changes the qth entry of V i to 1. At the end, vector V i records all the leaf nodes that C i can reach.
Other members of C sub create the vector in the same way. It should be noted that V = V 1 ∧ . . . ∧ V M has one and only one non-zero entry (here ∧ is the logical-and operation) because there is one and only one leaf node that all C sub can reach. Therefore, V = V 1 ∧ . . . ∧ V M should also have one and only one non-zero entry. Otherwise, C sub verify that the DT is not correct.
DISCUSSION OF SECURITY PROPERTY
The encryption scheme used in PPDM DT Cloud can ensure that confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of all the records in the database. For simplicity, here we only show how our scheme can defend some interesting attacks. In particular, Attacks 2 and 3 are related to the Strong Client Security property.
Attack 1
Throughout the whole scheme, note that r has the unique relationship with m. If one malicious party C l gets the r i, j1,k1 belong to C i , meanwhile, in C l 's database, he also contains the same value of r l, j2,k2 = r i, j1,k1 , then there is a very high possibility that m l, j2,k2 is equal to m i, j1,k1 . This is an attack that we want to avoid. We choose Paillier cryptographic algorithm, which has the property that encrypting the same message will give a different cipher text, to encrypt r to avoid this attack.
Attack 2
